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The Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans situation was 
commonly called a “natural disaster”—an anomalous 
“event” that disrupted lives, spaces, and organizations. 
Research and planning attention then focused on particular 
aspects of the event and on restoring order. In contrast, 
sociologists and similar-thinking scholars have increasingly 
viewed disaster situations from multiple locations and 
histories, often using systems theory. Here, reanalysis of 
empirical material from ethnographic research in New 
Orleans pre-and post-Katrina suggests that a sociological 
embeddedness perspective illustrates the dynamic 
seamlessness of past, present, and future economic contexts 
and social actions. The perspective’s constitutive concepts 
of weak, strong, and differentiated ties highlight the role of 
local knowledge, intermediary-led workforce networks, and 
sustained participatory planning in creating a robust 
economic environment. Toward this end, disaster research, 
planning, and theory building could incorporate network tie 
assessments into social vulnerability protocols, compare 
embeddedness with other perspectives, and learn from 
related international experiences.  
 
Scholars from numerous disciplines have contributed 
notably to knowledge about disaster prevention, response, 
and recovery, yet they and most of the general public 
viewed Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans in August 2005 
as a “natural disaster”—an anomalous “event” that 
disrupted lives, spaces, organizations, and institutions. By 
implication, these lives, spaces, organizations, and 
institutions were functioning adequately before the act of 
nature, thus the disruption only required interventions that 
would facilitate recovery or reestablishment of the prior 
state. In contrast, over the last couple of decades, disaster 
sociologists, as well as scholars from psychology, political 
science, anthropology, geography, and disaster research 
centers, came to see disasters as multifaceted, which led 
them to view the Hurricane Katrina—New Orleans 
situation as a mix of “natural” and “human-made” or 
“technological” causes and as a historically conditioned 
process (Brunsma, Overfelt, & Picou, 2007; Colten, 2006; 
Hartman & Squires, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 1996, 2006; 
Perry, 2005; Perry & Quarantelli, 2005). As such, these 
more complex theoretical perspectives on disaster were 
often based on systems theory (Barber, 1995; Erikson, 
2007; Ibata-Arens, Dierkes, & Zorn, 2006), which 
commonly posited discrete human and institutional actors, 
the goal of equilibrium or reestablishment of the status quo, 
binary distinctions between micro and macro or humans 
and nature, and at one extreme, a view in which “problems” 
are “attacked” through “social engineering” and the 
mentality of “expertism” (Montuori & Purser, 1996, p. 
185). From a traditional systems perspective, little attention 
was paid to local knowledge and participatory planning.  
 
An additional limitation of viewing the Hurricane Katrina–
New Orleans situation exclusively from traditional systems 
theory is that, epistemologically and practically, it 
maintains the fiction that “events” and social actors are at 
the same time bound together and yet independent of each 
other—a view that is paralleled by the structure of 
autonomous government departments and funding streams 
that provide institutionally separate prevention, response, or 
recovery efforts. For example, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) addresses temporary 
housing concerns in New Orleans and the U.S. Department 
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) addresses 
longer-term concerns, but neither concern has been 
addressed effectively (Cooper & Block, 2006), even 3 years 
after Katrina. Similarly, other components of an economic 
infrastructure, such as transportation, education and job 
training, child care, and employment, functioned 
autonomously in relation to the work efforts of many New 
Orleans residents before Katrina, and although these vitally 
related areas are essential to rebuilding the city economy, 
they remain structured and perceived as separate spheres. 
Arguably, contemporary system-based scholarship could 
yield more-valuable knowledge about the Hurricane 
Katrina–New Orleans situation, as it has emphasized the 
notions of dynamic processes and webs of connected 
relationships between the system parts that could even be 
considered mutually constitutive (Montuori & Purser, 
1996). Nevertheless, most disaster scholarship is based on 
the more constricted and totalizing nature of earlier systems 
concepts.  
 
In this context, as we reanalyzed empirical material on low-
income families and economic mobility from longitudinal 
ethnographic research we conducted in New Orleans before 
and after Hurricane Katrina, the underlying systems 
perspective that guided the original study (Iversen & 
Armstrong, 2006) did not seem to fully explain the 
embeddedness of New Orleans’s economic situation after 
the storm and levee failures in the city’s economic 
infrastructure over prior decades. Indeed, the possibility 
that a sociological embeddedness perspective might 
provide a particularly inclusive understanding of this 
disaster situation emerged inductively from these analyses, 
which we explore more fully in this article. As such, this 
article adds a new dimension to the earlier ethnographic 
findings and, in line with both Tierney’s (2007) and 
Quarantelli’s (2005) plea for further theoretical 
development in disaster research, hopes to open new 
theoretical territory for disaster sociologists and other 
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disaster scholars who find the new landscape compelling. 
This theoretical direction also holds the promise/potential 
of more adequate, relevant, and just problem viewpoints 
and planning directions.  
 
Briefly, an embeddedness perspective, with its theoretical 
origins in economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985, 1992b, 
2005; Polanyi, 2001/1944), posited economic action as 
social action (Jagd, 2007). It explicitly contested the 
neoclassical economics perspective which held that 
economic action was motivated by individualistic self-
interest and utility maximization, and thus left little room 
for solidarity, joint decision-making, or altruistic 
motivation for action. In other words, from an 
embeddedness perspective, economic, political, and 
relational phenomena are constitutive of social/economic 
action via networks of interpersonal and interorganizational 
“ties,” which are, to greater or lesser extents, formed out of 
trusted, reciprocal, and sustained relationships. Although 
anthropological scholars have also valuably put forth a 
perspective on embeddedness (Moody & White, 2003; 
Oliver-Smith, 2006; Schweizer, 1997), the sociological 
version is primary in this article for three reasons: it 
emphasizes the importance of network ties, which emerged 
as important in our research; the anthropological version 
tends to retain a systems orientation, even as it speaks of 
embeddedness; and anthropologists have taken the concept 
outside of the Granovetterian emphasis on economic action, 
which is this article’s focus. Accordingly, an embeddedness 
perspective in this article refers to the sociological version, 
which is amplified further in a later section.  
 
Specifically, we explore embedded networks in this article 
via their constitutive presence in the everyday phenomena 
of education and job training, labor market opportunity, and 
work policy supports, such as affordable child care and ad-
equate transportation, and particularly via a new form of 
community organization known as workforce 
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intermediaries (Giloth, 2004), which by their very structure 
and purpose, foster ties among human and organizational 
actors in urban locales such as New Orleans. This 
exploration seems increasingly necessary because disasters, 
as sociologically conceptualized, are on the rise in the 
United States and elsewhere due to increased development 
of physically hazardous parts of coastal  
or river-bank cities (Achenbach, 2008), the parallel 
increase in population density in disaster-prone areas 
(Picou & Marshall, 2007, p. 5), and politically influenced 
decisions about building shortcuts in those areas (Johnson, 
2008). For example, Revkin (2008) characterized the 
outcome of the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar in terms similar 
to those used for decades about New Orleans: “Deltas are 
disaster zones in waiting” (p. 3). In the United States, 
according to Dynes and Rodriguez (2007), “coastal 
counties constitute about 17% of the landmass (excluding 
Alaska), but 53% of the U.S. population (153 million 
people) live in these areas” (p. 31). Moreover, unequally 
distributed risks and results of disaster situations by 
economic status have been well documented, both in the 
United States and internationally, as Maruyama and 
Ruscher’s (2006) special issue on Hurricane Katrina and 
New Orleans in Analysis of Social issues and Public Policy 
richly illustrated. Referring to Katrina and the South Asian 
tsunami as exemplars, Beck (2006) contended that, locally 
and globally, “catastrophic risk follows the poor” (p. 339), 
a contention that Erikson (2006) expanded upon: “acute 
disasters very often visit the homes of people who have 
already been the victim of chronic disasters” (p. 11). 
Although wealthier families in New Orleans were also 
dislocated and deprived of homes and jobs, greater 
resources resulted in greater protection and resilience for 
most of them (Colten, 2006; Logan, 2006).  
 
Thus, because a systems perspective on disaster situations 
tends toward atomism rather than pluralism, and because 
disaster situations seem to be increasingly prevalent, this 
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article explores how a sociological embeddedness 
perspective might enhance participatory disaster prevention 
and mitigation and lead to more inclusive disaster and 
infrastructure planning, as follows. First, theoretical 
perspectives on disaster from multiple disciplines and from 
sociology are examined for their difference from, but 
possible movement toward, an embeddedness perspective. 
The concept of embeddedness is then presented more fully, 
particularly in relation to network ties, and a short section 
on the empirical and spatial context of the ethnographic 
research follows. The next section describes how the lived 
experiences of the New Orleans research families illustrate 
embeddedness and network ties; in particular, how well-or 
insufficiently embedded networks forward or constrain the 
families’ economic progress, dynamically and over time. 
The concluding section addresses theoretical and practical 
implications of broader incorporation of a social 
embeddedness perspective, both nationally and 
internationally.  
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Disaster 
 
Perspectives from Multiple Disciplines  
 
Disaster scholarship’s focus on a particular part of a 
disruptive “event” generally directed research and policy to 
a single aspect of the phenomenon, such as persons, 
institutions or the built environment. For example, although 
greatly simplified here, disaster scholars from the fields of 
psychology and social psychology frequently addressed 
human behavior and individual well-being (Gist, Lubin, & 
Red-burn, 1998; see also the first Special Issue on Katrina, 
Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 6(1), 2006). 
Relevant to the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation, 
these scholars valuably explored developmental factors and 
interventions that compounded or mediated stress (Gist et 
al., 1998). They also highlighted emergent community or 
neighborhood helping networks (Rodr´ıguez, Trainor, & 
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Quarantelli, 2006) or identified “system justification 
processes” (Napier, Mandizodza, Anderson, & Jost, 2006), 
such as stereotyping and victim-blaming. Others, from 
disciplines that include political science and social 
psychology, extensively documented the disproportionate 
suffering and disadvantage in post-Katrina New Orleans by 
characteristics such as race, gender, class, and age 
(Enarson, 2006; Gilman, 2006; Logan, 2006).  
 
Another set of scholars, perhaps the largest although not 
discipline specific, focused a technological, techno-political 
or techno-health lens on creating and implementing 
institutional or organizational strategies for disaster 
preparation and recovery management (Alexander, 2006; 
Donohue, Masilela, & Gear, 2000; Friedman & Relave, 
2005; Kettl, 2006), including the modeling of causal chains 
(Venton & Hansford, 2006). This research centered on 
managerial practices and operational capacities at city, 
state, and federal levels of government. In New Orleans, 
this meant identifying what prevention plans had been in 
place, what communications, resources, and supplies were 
needed immediately after the hurricane, and later, in 
microscopic detail, analysis of what went wrong where, 
when and why. Still others, often from the fields of 
geography or engineering, directed a spatial, geophysical 
lens on nature and natural forces (Gordon, 2007; United 
States Risk Management, 2007). Such lenses focused on 
the built environment and land use, primarily to assess 
reconstruction strategies, although some assessed the 
interface of the geophysical and social as well (Cutter & 
Emrich, 2006). In New Orleans, this meant analyzing ways 
to strengthen the levee system and assessing which spaces 
were and were not physically sound for rebuilding.  
 
The predominant emphasis on response and recovery, and 
on conceptualizing the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans 
situation as a “natural disaster” and as an “event” in much 
of this literature underscored Quarantelli’s (2005) 
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contention that disaster research has been approached 
ahistorically since the beginning of the field. In contrast, 
sociological lenses on disaster have increasingly been 
multifocal and multivariate (Perry, 2005; Perry & 
Quarantelli, 2005).  
 
Sociological and Related Perspectives on Disaster  
 
Generally speaking, a sociological orientation to disaster 
theory and research has emphasized the intersections and 
interactions between personal lives and the socio-political-
economic environment in which lives were lived. In other 
words, the field of disaster sociology applied theoretical 
understanding about society to social phenomena and to 
research-based social policies and practices in turn, as two 
extremely reflective overviews of the field have shown 
(Quarantelli, 2005; Tierney, 2007). As such, most disaster 
sociologists, as well as sociologically oriented disaster 
scholars from other disciplines, viewed a situation such as 
Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans from multiple 
locations and histories—often from a systems perspective, 
as discussed earlier, or from a social vulnerability approach 
or mix of the two (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Cutter 
2005, 2006; Cutter & Emrich, 2006; Tierney, 2006, 2007; 
Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006; Wisner, 2001). The 
social construction of the situation, historical lodging, and 
emphasis on social structure were features of these 
approaches that moved toward an embeddedness 
perspective, although more implicitly than explicitly.  
 
For example, toward the notion of constructed rather than 
factual truths, Hartmann (1999) argued that, “Actors’ 
interpretation of disasters crucially depends on the political 
and social environment in which they occur” (p. 1, 
emphasis added). Similarly, Stahl, Lichtenstein, and 
Mangan (2003) characterized responses to a situation such 
as a hurricane as “depending on social agreements and 
individual perceptions” (p. 18); in effect, as Quarantelli 
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(2005) contended, as a constructed “social problem” rather 
than as a “focused occasion in terms of time and space”  
(p. 334). Notably, Granovetter (1992a) himself associated 
constructionism with embeddedness, contending that, 
“economic institutions do not emerge automatically in 
response to economic needs; rather, they are constructed by 
individuals whose action is both facilitated and constrained 
by the structure and resources available in social networks 
in which they are embedded” (p. 7). Given the importance 
of language to constructionism, Stallings (2005) 
characterized what others call a “disaster,” a “social 
situation,” which this article has amended to “disaster 
situation.”  
 
Regarding historical lodging, a collection of 
multidisciplinary scholars’ responses to Hurricane Katrina 
in a recent volume edited by Hartman and Squires (2006) 
fully acknowledged the role of the past in creating the 
conditions for disaster in New Orleans, via both systems 
and social vulnerability perspectives. These contributions 
implied, but did not explicitly identify that poor health, 
housing, environmental, education, labor market, and 
employment conditions were embedded in the economic 
and social action of human and institutional actors in pre-
Katrina New Orleans.  
 
Similarly, a volume of recent sociological contributions, 
edited by Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou (2007), actively 
redressed Quarantelli’s (2005) concern about the ahistorical 
nature of disaster research. However, as Tierney (2007) 
contended elsewhere about the field in general, Clarke 
(2007) charged that current disaster literature, including the 
Brunsma et al. volume, has concentrated mostly on what 
happened during and immediately after Katrina, rather than 
on what happened before the storm and what will happen in 
the future (p. 237). As such, he concluded that, “we need a 
lot more attention on what creates the conditions that lead 
to calamity in the first place” (p. 237). Along these lines, 
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while the contributions in the Brunsma et al. volume did 
not explicitly conceptualize disaster situations as 
embedded, Barnshaw and Trainor’s (2007) chapter focused 
on “the process of social capital conversion/ transformation 
into resources [during disasters]” (p. 95) ...which 
“highlights the form and operation of the networks within 
which resources are embedded” (p. 96). As such, Barnshaw 
and Trainor moved firmly toward the embeddedness 
perspective discussed in this article, even though their 
chapter still evidenced a lingering systems orientation 
whereby individuals, social structures, and social 
institutions were located on intersecting rather than 
mutually constitutive paths.  
 
Along structural lines, Quarantelli (2005) contended that 
“disasters are inherently social phenomena and that the 
source of disasters is rooted in the social structure or social 
system” (p. 339). Extending Quarantelli’s view, Hilhorst’s 
(2003) “mutuality paradigm” looked at the mutual 
constitution of society and environment (p. 2). Other 
sociologists took a structural social vulnerability approach 
to disaster research, emphasizing, as have some 
anthropologists and geographers, “the social creation of 
vulnerability” (Oliver-Smith, 1996, p. 314). Kroll-Smith 
(2001) argued for a “vulnerability analysis,” which by 
definition implied different levels of risk (Smith, 2006), 
holding that, “disasters are always more than physical 
catastrophes with social consequences; they are also the 
outcome of a complex and long-running interplay of power 
and geography that works to shield some people from the 
whims of nature or the negligence of dangerous industries 
while exposing others to the unwanted fallout of these acts 
of nature and man” (Kroll-Smith, p. 175). Similarly, 
Erikson (2006) contended that while we have become more 
adept at technological measurement of hurricanes, we are 
not good at “calculating the levels of the vulnerability of 
the human, social and environmental landscapes that 
disasters strike” (p. 7). He called for the development of a 
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vulnerability index, which, by then, had been created by 
sociologically oriented cultural geographers (Cutter, 2005; 
Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003) and called the Social 
Vulnerability Index (SoVI). When Cutter and colleagues 
(2003) developed the SoVI, they worked from the part-
systems, part-embeddedness premise that “social 
vulnerability is partially the product of social inequalities 
.... however, it also includes place inequalities—those 
characteristics of communities and the built environment, 
such as the level of urbanization, growth rates, and 
economic vitality, that contribute to  
[i.e. constitute] the social vulnerability of places” (p. 243). 
In a sense, the index’s continuous and dynamic association 
of an area’s social, political and economic hazards with the 
area’s vulnerability to a disaster situation implied the 
notion of embeddedness and its constitutive structural 
influences.  
 
Similarly, Tierney’s (2007) emphasis on the inherent 
lodging of disaster situations in community life, and on the 
“need for strengthening community resilience, building 
public-private partnerships, reaching out to marginalized 
community residents and their trusted institutions, and 
developing consensus-based coordinating mechanisms at 
the interorganizational, community, and intergovernmental 
levels” (Tierney et al., 2006, p. 76), approached the idea of 
embeddedness in its focus on the need for participatory, 
multimodal, and networked planning. Finally, 
anthropologists Breunlin and Regis (2006) made brief 
mention of embeddedness and network ties in their analysis 
of the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation, 
demonstrating that both concepts are well-suited for 
multidisciplinary examination.  
 
In sum, these sociological and related disciplinary positions 
on disaster situations not only valuably posited a systemic 
interrelatedness of persons, organizations and institutions, 
but some also moved toward the notion that economic and 
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social actions are embedded in—that is, are constitutive 
of—an urban environment’s structures, policies and 
practices. This embeddedness perspective is amplified next.  
 
Embeddedness and Network Ties  
 
Although Polanyi (2001/1944) and Weber (1978/1922), 
respectively, mentioned or implied the concept of 
embeddedness, Granovetter (1985) produced the seminal 
formulation of the concept, which he initially described as, 
“the extent to which economic action [behavior] is 
embedded in structures of social relations” (p. 481), and 
later (1992a) as, “the embeddedness of economic goals and 
activities in socially oriented goals and structures” (p. 3). 
Most recently, Granovetter described embeddedness as, 
“the way social and economic activities are mixed up with 
networks of social relations” (Krippner, Granovetter, 
Block, Biggart, & Beamish, 2004, p. 113). Swedberg 
(2003) contended similarly that “an economic action is in 
principle always ‘embedded’ in some form or another of 
social structure” (p. 28). On both views, “structures” are 
positions created by the distribution of the relational ties 
between actors (Schweizer, 1997, p. 751) and are “a result 
of rules and resources that exist in and through the 
activities of human agents” (Miller & Rivera, 2007, p. 
144). In other words, as Coleman (1990) put it, 
“Granovetter’s notion of embeddedness may be seen as an 
attempt to introduce into the analysis of economic systems 
social and organizational relations” (p. 302). 
  
Indeed, Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) earlier work on 
network ties formed a constitutive part of his 
embeddedness theory, in that networks, and thus econom-
ically embedded social actions, result either from “strong” 
ties, which generally signify intensive but narrowly 
bounded relationships and opportunities, or from “weak” 
ties, whereby a broader range of information and 
opportunities inhere to more distant relationships or 
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contacts. Illustrating this from the perspective of the job 
seeker, strong ties might consist of neighbors and/or social 
groups that would be likely to provide overlapping and thus 
limited information about job possibilities, whereas weak 
ties, such as staff in job training or workforce organizations 
or persons whose networks radiate out to multiple distant 
contact points, potentially provide a new and expanded 
landscape of job possibilities.  
 
Further, economic sociologists have recently extended 
Granovetter’s tie concept through attention to the content or 
quality of the ties as well as to the structures formed by the 
ties (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007): in particular, the 
emotional valence in, level of trust fostered by, and quality 
of information transferred through the tie relationship. 
Zelizer (2002) also extended Granovetter’s tie concept, 
holding that people differentiate among particular kinds of 
interpersonal relations, which in turn form different 
practices, rights and obligations, or “differentiated” ties. 
Similarly, Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs (2000) extended 
Granovetter’s work on social network resources with the 
question, “how do individuals, in response to a particular 
event, choose to activate particular sectors of the multiple 
networks in which they are embedded” (p. 599). These 
extensions mean that a weak tie, such as an organization in 
a workforce intermediary’s network, needs its staff to 
develop personal relationships with the job seeker or with 
another organization’s staff, needs to provide consistent 
service in order to be perceived as trustworthy, and needs 
to offer high-quality and differentiated contacts to be an 
effective choice for the job seeker or organization.  
 
Equally important, although Granovetter’s network tie 
concept has been characterized as the same as “social 
capital,” the two concepts are both similar and different. 
Although both concern economic phenomena and both 
“inhere in the structure of relations within which purposive 
action takes place” (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993, p. 
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1322), social capital relationships are more commonly 
dyadic and linear, whereas network ties are more likely to 
be multiple and concurrent. In addition, early theorizing 
about social capital presented it as solely positive, whereas 
some later versions and most conceptualizations of network 
ties identify the potential for both positive and negative 
valences and outcomes. Following Granovetter, the concept 
of network ties rather than social capital is used in this 
article.  
 
In all, Granovetter tried to show theoretically that economic 
behavior involved more than rational choices by atomized, 
independent actors. On his view, economic action and 
decision-making occurred through, as Lazer (2006) put it, 
“relational ties and one’s structural position in a network of 
personal contacts” (p. 1). As a result, Granovetter’s 
conception of embeddedness has generally been applied at 
micro and meso levels; that is, at individuals and 
organizations as they “mediate the effects of macroscopic 
processes” (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990, p. 3). The 
exploration and discussion in this article follows in that 
direction.  
 
Importantly, while Granovetter’s (1985) formulation of 
embeddedness is considered seminal, it is not without 
critique, which has charged incomplete development of the 
concept at the macro or market/economy level (Barber, 
1995; Krippner & Alvarez, 2007), the ambiguity, varied 
uses, and often insufficient specification of the term 
(Moody & White, 2003; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993), 
and its exclusive reliance on networks (Swedberg, 1997). 
As the exploration in this article directly concerns micro 
and meso rather than macro levels, that aspect of the 
critique may be less relevant. Regarding ambiguity, 
however, in this article we strive for specificity and 
consistency in our use of the term. Arguably, the recent 
extensions to embeddedness theory noted earlier have 
deepened its potential relevance to the Hurricane Katrina–
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New Orleans situation, as will be illustrated in the family 
experiences which follow the brief discussion of research 
procedures and pre-Katrina New Orleans next.  
 
Empirical and Spatial Context of the Ethnographic 
Research in New Orleans 
Research Procedures  
 
Between 1998 and 2003, the principal investigator (first 
author) and her team of eight local researchers, which 
included the second author, conducted ethnographic 
research in five U.S. cities—one of which was New 
Orleans. In order to better understand the mobility efforts 
of low-income families (commonly called “the working 
poor”) under economically challenging urban conditions, 
the team identified a set of “key parents” who had 
participated in job training programs affiliated with a 
national workforce demonstration program and followed 
them for up to five years (see Iversen & Armstrong, 2006, 
for complete description of research methods). In each city, 
a designated workforce intermediary organization (Giloth, 
2004) strove to develop seamless networks of employment-
related education, training and service organizations, 
policymakers, and community members to foster the 
economic well-being of families and communities. The 
New Orleans workforce intermediary also conducted a 
four-week pre-employment program, which the study 
participants attended.  
 
Using formal and informal interviews and observation in 
the families’ natural settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), the 
team spent time in the families’ homes, neighborhoods and 
extended family networks, and also in the parents’ job 
training sites, community organizations, firms and 
children’s schools. The research design overall was similar 
to Duneier’s (1999) extended place method, Marcus’s 
(1998) multisited ethnography, and Burawoy’s (2003) 
reflexive ethnography. In the explicit attempt to link micro 
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with macro processes (Burawoy et al., 2000; Willis, 2000), 
these methods of inquiry begin with a core place or person 
and fan out organically to those in contact with, mentioned 
by, and relevant to the core per-son(s) along the dimension 
of interest. “Fanning out” enabled us to contact over 1,000 
auxiliary persons and organizations associated with the 
families in the five cities—around 200 in New Orleans 
alone.  
 
The audiotaped and transcribed material was analyzed 
qualitatively by multiple analysts, first through the creation 
of computer-assisted coded themes and then through the 
construction of individual family stories according to a 
diachronic narrative approach (Ostrander, 1995), or telling 
a story through time. Demographic data on the key parents 
from training program administrative records (Hebert et al., 
2002) was compared quantitatively with the same data 
collected on the other 4,000 workforce demonstration 
participants who found jobs after their training program.  
Parent characteristics were also compared with those of 
recipients of Unemployment Insurance (Needels, Corson, 
& Nicholson, 2001) and Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2001), which became the safety net programs after the 
welfare reform legislation of 1996. These comparisons 
suggested that the study sample was substantively similar 
to millions of low-earning families across the United 
States.  
 
Although the original ethnographic research formally ended 
in mid-2003, the authors spent a week in New Orleans in 
February 2006 to explore what might lie ahead for the 
research families if they were to return to the city. We 
conducted observations and interviews with former and 
new research participants, some of which continued 
periodically thereafter. While the original research was 
loosely guided by a systems perspective on the 
interrelationships between persons/ families and 
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organizations, reanalysis of what the workforce 
intermediary network meant and resulted in for the job 
training participants and their families suggested that 
network ties were a critical aspect of their mobility process, 
for good and ill. Alternative explanations cannot be fully 
ruled out, however. For example, some scholars working in 
an embeddedness tradition in anthropology have conceptu-
alized systems and subsystems as “sets of embedded 
networks” (Wolfe, as cited in Schweizer, 1997, p. 775), 
rather than as different ways to conceptualize social action, 
as this article does. That said, triangulation of researchers, 
respondents, and analysts, which included families’ review 
of their narratives, or what Burawoy (2003) called 
“valedictory revisiting,” increased the authenticity of the 
findings and credibility of the interpretations (Padgett, 
2008).  
 
Pre-Katrina New Orleans1  
 
The spatial context for examining a sociological 
embeddedness perspective on a disaster situation concerns 
the economic environment for the research families and 
thousands like them in New Orleans before as well as after 
Hurricane Katrina. Regarding its workforce, the city of 
New Orleans had lost 18% of its population between 1970 
and 2000 (Muro et al., 2005, p. 4), and an additional 1% 
between 2000 and July 2005 (Liu & Plyer, 2008, p. 11). 
Regarding job opportunities, New Orleans’s share of 
metropolitan area jobs had dropped from 66% in 1970 to  
42% in 2000, and the remaining jobs shifted from the 
higher-wage manufacturing sector to the lower-wage 
service and retail sectors (Muro et al., 2005). Nearly 87% 
of the jobs for all New Orleanians were in the service 
                                                 
1 All data about New Orleans in the paper pertain to Orleans Parish 
alone, and not to the New Orleans metropolitan region, which includes 
parishes less harmed by the Hurricane Katrina situation. Orleans Parish 
and the city of New Orleans are the same demographic and geographic 
entity. 
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sector, and in 2003 the average annual pay in half of those 
jobs fell below the national average (Muro et al., 2005). 
Even in the few higher-paying industries in New Orleans, 
wage levels were not robust. The national average weekly 
wage in private industry in 2000 was $648, which was 
13.1% higher than the comparable wage in New Orleans 
(Dolfman, Wasser, & Bergman, 2007, p. 5). More 
generally, a long history of inadequate public transportation 
(Taylor, 1984), especially outside the tourist areas, plus a 
weak educational system that Plaisance (2006) 
characterized as “one of the nation’s worst,” not only 
limited access to existing jobs but also discouraged 
industrial development. The families’ employment efforts 
were thus embedded in a shrinking economic context, as 
their lived experiences suggest.  
 
An Embeddedness Perspective and Families’ Lived 
Experience 
 
Narrative material2 from the New Orleans families seemed 
to illustrate how the network aspects of embeddedness 
theory—network structures and network ties, as evidenced 
particularly in the form of the workforce intermediary and 
its relational network—constituted the pre-Katrina 
economic conditions in New Orleans in which the families’ 
post-Katrina economic potential is embedded.  
 
These examples are only three of many.  
 
Elizabeth Seabrook  
 
Thirty-seven-year-old Elizabeth Seabrook had been 
employed as a certified nursing assistant for many years, 
                                                 
2 All person names are pseudonyms chosen by the families. 
Pseudonyms for auxiliary persons and organizations were chosen by 
the authors.  
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but found over time that she couldn’t support her two 
preschool-aged children on that income and thus sought a 
more financially and personally rewarding career. In 2000, 
she enrolled in the New Orleans workforce intermediary’s 
pre-employment program, whose administrators had de-
veloped and nurtured network ties with a local community 
college, which enabled Elizabeth to enroll in the college’s 
medical technology training program. Despite the well-
developed community college ties, the network might have 
better facilitated Elizabeth’s success if it had also fostered 
ties with secondary education institutions.  
 
Indeed, the medical technology program was designed to 
be 18 months long, but even before the storm, Elizabeth 
had been a full-time student for over three years. In 2002, a 
college administrator told the research team that Elizabeth 
was required to enroll in mostly remedial subjects, in part 
because the high school education she received in New 
Orleans public schools had been substandard in quality.  
Illustrating this, at least 41% of fourth-graders and at least 
59% of eighth-graders in New Orleans failed the 
standardized Louisiana Educational Assessment Program 
[LEAP] test in 2002–2003 (Nelson, 2003). Although 
remedial courses are prevalent among community college 
students across the United States (Schemo, 2006), the 
inadequacy of Elizabeth’s earlier schooling, despite the fact 
that she’d earned excellent high school grades, severely 
constrained her progress. The other constraint on Elizabeth, 
and on prior training program graduates in the medical 
program, was the problem of incomplete information 
exchange in the college-intermediary network, as the 
college administrator described:  
 
The pre-employment program graduates at the Community College 
campus are typically not ‘college literate.’ I don’t think the problems 
arose entirely out of academic incompetence. In fact, the [intermediary] 
program grads generally matched the college norm in terms of 
background and testing ability. Most students were in college for the 
first time and 80% of those in health areas began in remedial 
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coursework for at least one subject. I feel that the problems are more 
systemic, mainly concerning communication breakdowns in the areas 
of recruitment and admissions. And in my opinion, the program staff 
lack a working knowledge of the college’s regimented testing 
procedures, which also caused stumbling blocks. Community College 
administrator, fall 2002  
 
 
In addition, education policy in the early 2000s was not 
attuned to students like Elizabeth. In order to be eligible for 
the total allotment of federal education funding for training 
like the medical technology program, the student must 
attend school full time. However, Elizabeth often held three 
jobs simultaneously in order to support her family, which 
left little time for the amount of studying required of a full-
time student. Thus, Elizabeth not only had to take remedial 
courses, she had to repeat courses that she failed because 
she didn’t have enough time or energy to study. One of 
Elizabeth’s more desperate strategies to succeed against 
such odds was to listen to lesson tapes through headphones 
while she slept. To compensate for such challenges, some 
intermediaries in other cities used their network 
relationships to embed on-site mentoring of students or new 
workers in their vocational institutions or businesses, which 
increased the level of trust and quality of information 
exchanged. However, this action was absent in the New 
Orleans network, as an intermediary administrator 
lamented:  
 
The Community College’s curriculum requirements were problematic. 
At the pre-employment program, we originally expected that the 
college would cater to program graduates. However, the requirements 
of licensure state certification and exams proved to be too cumbersome 
for an established and relatively entrenched institution, and as a result 
the college was unable to accommodate program grads by customizing 
their programs. Consequently, our students were unable to register for 
technical courses, and as a result upwards of 60 percent were dropping 
out. Intermediary administrator, winter 2002  
 
Elizabeth’s intermediary’s network would also have been 
strengthened by more robust ties to subsidized, quality 
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child-care facilities. In Elizabeth’s experience, center-based 
care was either affordable but poor quality (in one site, her 
children were never allowed outside) or higher quality but 
unaffordable. Thus, in order to meet the multiple demands 
 
Fig. 1. Grounds of Elizabeth Seabrook’s mother’s senior care housing 
facility, February 2006.  
 
of work, school, and parenting, Elizabeth depended 
extensively on her aging, chronically ill mother for before-
and after-school help with the children. Although post-
Katrina child-care assistance has been characterized as 
more flexible and accessible than earlier (Louisiana 
Department of Social Services, 2008), a workforce network 
would need to ensure that sufficient slots were available for 
returning families. As of April 2008, only about two in five 
(41%) of former child-care facilities in Orleans Parish had 
reopened (Liu & Plyer, 2008, p. 50).  
 
Three years post-Katrina, we still don’t know where 
Elizabeth, her children or her mother are, or how they are 
faring. Chronically ill elderly persons in senior care 
facilities, such as Elizabeth’s mother, seemed forgotten 
both during and after Katrina, as the abandoned wheelchair 
in front of the mother’s abandoned facility portrays (Figure 
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1). We do know, however, the Elizabeth and her family 
were embedded in a deeply inadequate economic 
infrastructure in New Orleans long before the hurricane, 
and that despite its aims and community college ties, the 
network at that time was not sufficiently developed to 
compensate for the missing ties. While Elizabeth’s network 
situation lacked education and child-care coherence, Rachel 
Quinn’s lacked employment attunement.  
 
Rachel Quinn  
 
At age 40, after two-plus years of post-secondary 
education, no degree, and a series of short-term jobs, 
Rachel Quinn enrolled in construction training to improve 
her career path and try to move her family out of public 
housing. She had already enhanced her two teenaged 
children’s futures by navigating their enrollment in 
specialized high schools far from the family’s high-poverty 
neighborhood because their neighborhood high school was 
rated “unacceptable” by state standards (Louisiana 
Department of Education, 2001). In spring 2006, as Rachel 
reported from her displacement city on the East Coast, her 
son was in college and her daughter was advancing in 
military service.  
 
Earlier, after completing the workforce intermediary’s four-
week pre-employment program, Rachel was hired by a 
construction labor union that was part of the intermediary’s 
network, and “on paper” she earned a family-sustaining 
income. However, Rachel was channeled into event 
carpentry rather than residential or commercial carpentry, 
which meant that she constructed temporary displays and 
booths for conventions, conferences, and large product 
shows. Even before the hurricane, there wasn’t enough 
business to keep all the event carpenters fully employed, as 
Rachel’s supervisor related:  
Only about one hundred of the two hundred and fifty to three hundred union 
members at trade show sites work a full forty-hour work week. Rachel Quinn’s 
construction union supervisor, 2003.  
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Consistent with the supervisor’s comments, although 
Rachel technically held a full-time job, she was only 
assigned part-time work. This also meant that her projected 
annual income of $28,204 only resulted in about $6,000.  
Moreover, the potential work environment for Rachel in 
post-Katrina New Orleans reflected its embeddedness in 
the state of the industry before Katrina. Six months after 
the storm, Rachel’s former supervisor described the 
debilitated construction market for locals:  
 
Some carpentry work is available for residential facilities, but there 
isn’t any yet for commercial facilities. This is partly because very few 
journeymen have returned to the city and electrical outages are 
continual ...In addition, the Hispanics came and got all the early 
construction work. Rachel Quinn’s construction union supervisor, 
February 2006  
 
The supervisor’s final comment was, in fact, an accurate 
reflection of the early post-Katrina demography in New 
Orleans, as Maruyama and Ruscher (2006) reported: 
“Approximately half of the reconstruction workforce in 
Orleans metropolitan area is Latino, and approximately half 
of these individuals are undocumented workers. The vast 
majority (87%) relocated from another location elsewhere 
in the United States where they had lived prior to Katrina” 
(p. 257). Two years after Katrina, the demographic shift to 
a higher proportion Hispanic and a lower proportion 
African American persisted (Plyer, 2007). Thus, because 
trade show construction was so limited, if Rachel returned 
to New Orleans, she would have to remain in public 
housing—if it were available.  
 
In reality, even before Katrina, Housing Authority of New 
Orleans (HANO) officials had discussed converting 
Rachel’s development into mixed-income  
housing, which is a trend seen nationally (Ouroussoff, 
2006). An earlier public redevelopment project in New 
Orleans resulted in about 25% low-income units and 75% 
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market-rate units, which meant that only about 70 of the 
800 low-income families who previously lived there, fewer 
than one in 10, were able or eligible to return (Kamenetz, 
2005). Although a grass-roots coalition of former residents 
and New Orleans advocates actively contested the city’s 
public housing demolition and rebuilding plans (Cacibauda, 
2007), and Rachel’s development was part of the 
intermediary’s network, both sets of relationships consisted 
of strong rather than weak ties, which meant they were 
constrained in their impact on broader housing conditions. 
In fact, as the barbed wire fence in the 2006 photo 
portended (Figure 2), demolition of Rachel’s former 
development began in December 2007 (Ouroussoff, 2007), 
adding to the 60% reduction in the city’s public housing 
stock (Lehrer, 2008). Thus, while the intermediary’s weak  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Rachel Quinn’s public housing development, February 2006. 
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tie to the construction union facilitated Rachel’s original 
employment, the quality of the tie and of her job was  
inadequate. As a result, Rachel was unable to move 
forward economically or out of public housing pre-Katrina, 
and now both mobility avenues seem closed. Last, Joseph 
Faithful experienced an inadequate weak-tie network, 
which he replaced with a strong-tie network that seemed 
beneficial for the short run, but limited for the long run.  
 
Joseph Faithful  
 
In the early 2000s, Joseph Faithful’s family’s church took 
on an “informal” intermediary role in joining families, skill 
training, and jobs in a seamless network of strong ties. In 
this case, strong ties seemed surprisingly beneficial, much 
as they have been for many immigrant enclaves (Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993), likely because the marginalized 
position of both Joseph and immigrant groups meant that 
weaker ties were less readily available to them. 
Alternatively, the benefits of the strong ties were illusory.  
 
Joseph was a 23-year-old high school graduate and a 
married father of two infant children. He had earlier, and 
passionately, pursued a construction career through the 
New Orleans workforce intermediary’s construction 
apprenticeship program, but the program lacked reciprocity 
with the intermediary such that Joseph’s only assignment in 
the first days of the apprenticeship was to pick up trash. 
Holding that he “did not go to all this training and take two 
[unpaid] months out of my life so that I could go pick up 
trash,” Joseph left the apprenticeship for a job outside the 
construction field in order to support his family, and 
severed his relationship with the intermediary and its 
network. In response to this particular event, as Hurlbert, 
Haines, and Beggs (2000) would have described, Joseph 
activated the family’s church as his “official” workforce 
network.  
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As a strong tie, the church offered emotional and 
instrumental support for Joseph’s work efforts. 
Emotionally, the church was “family,” as both Joseph and 
his wife were partially estranged from their families of 
origin. Instrumentally, because the church served as the 
umbrella for an informal construction business, Joseph 
found construction employment and mentoring with 
George, a trusted church colleague who was a self-
employed contractor. While Joseph’s income arrangement 
with George was under-the-table, raising the question of 
whether staying with the construction apprenticeship might 
have been more economically productive, Joseph valued 
the encouragement and breadth of experience he gained 
under George’s tutelage. Still, had Joseph remained in the 
workforce network’s apprenticeship and moved up in union 
ranks, weak ties to the industry’s multi-state resources 
might have benefited him during displacement after the 
hurricane.  
 
Alternatively, the fact that the church operated satellites in 
several different parts of New Orleans meant that it could 
potentially remain a useful intermediary after Hurricane 
Katrina—at least to the extent that the church’s network as 
a whole remained functional. Although, to our knowledge,  
 
 
Fig. 3. Joseph Faithful’s former living room, Lower Ninth Ward, 
February 2006.  
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by spring 2006, Joseph and his family had not returned to 
New Orleans, the local researcher reported that the church 
had set up residential construction work in one of its less-
damaged satellites such that it continued to be a source of 
economic and social support for its remaining parishioners. 
Other than this hub, however, as Rachel Quinn’s supervisor 
had reported, residential construction work in post-Katrina 
New Orleans was rare.  
 
Moreover, the house in the Lower Ninth Ward that George 
owned and rented to Joseph and his family before Katrina 
was completely demolished by the storm, as the picture of 
the former living room shows (Figure 3). Thus the 
constricted opportunity for Joseph Faithful in today’s New 
Orleans seemed to reflect that sole reliance on strong ties 
might not have been the most economically productive 
pathway for him in the long run.  
 
Furthering a Sociological Embeddedness Perspective 
for Disaster Research and Policy 
 
The narratives of Elizabeth, Rachel, Joseph, and a few of 
the 200 auxiliary contacts from our ethnographic research 
in New Orleans, suggest that even before Hurricane 
Katrina, the economic environment in the city only 
minimally supported the productivity of families headed by 
lower earners. The limited economic (i.e., educational, 
housing, employment, and work support policy) 
infrastructure in which these families had been embedded 
for decades was surely worsened but not caused by Katrina. 
Nevertheless, the focus of most public discourse and social 
action after Katrina has been on remedies to particular 
technological, geophysical or political aspects, such as 
communications systems, levee reconstruction, or 
government disaster planning and responses.  
 
This contrast between constitutive and particularistic 
orientations to the social milieu reminds us that 
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conceptualizing and defining a phenomenon is far more 
than linguistic, as Perry (2005) and Quarantelli (2005, 
2006) contended as well. Conceptualizing the Hurricane 
Katrina–New Orleans situation as “natural” or as an 
anomalous “event” has obscured the fact that it is equally 
viable to conceptualize such a disaster situation as 
embedded economic choices over time and throughout a 
society. As the empirical examples from the pre-and post-
Katrina ethnography suggest, a sociological embeddedness 
perspective on disaster situations seems highly congruent 
with families’ lived experience; in particular, the obvious 
and dynamic seamlessness of past, present and future 
economic contexts and social actions.  
 
As such, a more intensive and extensive incorporation of 
the sociological concepts of embeddedness (Granovetter, 
1985; Krippner et al., 2004) and “weak,” “strong,” and 
“differentiated” network ties (Granovetter, 1973; Hurlbert, 
Beggs, & Haines, 2006; Zelizer, 2002), may provide a 
generative direction for theory building among disaster 
scholars as they harness and expand upon many rich 
contributions from multiple disciplines. In particular, 
Elizabeth’s, Rachel’s, and Joseph’s very typical stories 
about trying to move ahead through training and better jobs 
underscore that the strength, content, and quality of 
different ties are all critical components of an effective 
workforce network. Accordingly, attention needs to be paid 
not only to which network ties are activated, but also to 
how they are cultivated in the social environment over 
time.  
 
At base, an embeddedness perspective converts the macro 
and micro from binaries to the notion of a fluid and 
dynamic continuum of social actions, which, in addition to 
guiding theory, provides openings for more inclusive social 
planning and policy directions. Illustrating a similar step, 
Trigilia (2007) stressed that a network of relations between 
individuals and a network of relations between 
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organizations or collective actors are both important: “A 
good network of relations between interest organizations, 
financial institutions, universities and local governments [in 
effect, ‘weak’ ties] can favor the improvement of 
infrastructural facilities and the efficient provision of 
economic and social services, as well as ...the establishment 
of effective cooperation between economic actors and 
research and training institutions” (p. 69). Planning, policy, 
and research implications of an embeddedness perspective 
for post-Katrina New Orleans follow along similar lines.  
 
Beginning with neighborhood and community planning for 
New Orleans, network tie concepts might be usefully 
incorporated into an existing risk assessment protocol such 
as the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) (Cutter et al., 
2003; Cutter & Emrich, 2006), which reveals spatial as 
well as temporal differences in social vulnerability 
according to a broad set of demographic and environmental 
actions and actors. Used ground-up by community 
networks coordinated by workforce intermediaries (Giloth, 
2004) or by faith-based intermediaries (Holcombe, 2007), 
versus solely top-down, which as anthropologists Breunlin 
and Regis (2006) described, “disproportionately impact 
black and low-income communities in New Orleans” (p. 
744), an enhanced SoVI assessment might help Elizabeth, 
Rachel, Joseph and others like them to identify the unique 
roles and resources that each type of tie relationship in or 
available to their network could contribute to strengthening 
their general, everyday lives. At the same time, developing 
different network ties could strengthen and enhance 
individual and organizational hurricane evacuation 
decisions, dislocation responses, or recovery strategies. As 
one example, illustrated in both Rachel’s and Joseph’s 
narratives, pre-Katrina assessment of the structure and 
quality of their tie relationships could have identified what 
emotional and instrumental support networks were 
available as well as what disadvantages might inhere to 
exclusive reliance on them. Post-Katrina and for the future 
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more generally, an enhanced SoVI or similar assessment 
could help Joseph identify and engage additional weak tie 
relationships, such as potentially fruitful employment, 
housing or relocation contacts and resources. Similar 
assessment could help Rachel build a network of weak tie 
relationships that might buffer and provide alternatives to 
her conflicting work and housing contexts.  
 
More broadly, assessment of network ties through an 
enhanced vulnerability protocol could be aimed at more 
inclusive and potentially more effective infrastructure 
planning in New Orleans—what traditional disaster 
scholars call “strengthening,” both for preventive 
mitigation of disaster effects and for increased resilience in 
recovery and to establish a stronger economy for the future 
(Berke & Campanella, 2006; McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, & 
Weber, 2002). Such planning could engage community 
members in natural neighborhood groups such as 
community centers, faith organizations, or workforce 
intermediaries with broader organizational and institutional 
networks, and lead to more participatory decisions and 
actions that would be actively sustained over time.  
 
Organizing networks around such localized groups has a 
good chance of being effective in New Orleans because of 
the city’s long tradition of ward and neighborhood 
identification. For example, Capowich and Kondkar (2007) 
reported that after a series of neighborhood planning 
meetings about rebuilding New Orleans neighborhoods 
took place, the process of combining these plans into 
district-level project proposals had begun (p. 185). 
“Maximum participation by the entire community” 
(Costanza et al., 2006, p. 319) has been viewed by many as 
critical for the viable future of New Orleans, as this and 
other research (Ethridge, 2006; Hartman & Squires, 2006) 
contend as well. In other words, “the focus should be on 
local preferences and local knowledge” (Kiesling & Irons, 
2005, p. 3), with all their inherent and potentially 
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generative differences, and explicitly not on a uniform, 
one-size-fits-all design.  
 
Another benefit of a neighborhood/community-based SoVI 
extension is that regardless of the divisions that exist in a 
locale by class, race, risk (Beck, 2006) and the like, as 
Elliott and Pais (2006) reported, “people respond to 
disasters not as isolated individuals but as members of 
overlapping forms of social affiliation, which interpret, 
affirm and support particular definitions and responses to 
the situation” (p. 300), or as Breunlin and Regis (2006) put 
it, the role of people [i.e. through network ties] “is as a 
platform for reproducing life in the city” (p. 761). Thus, an 
extended SoVI-type assessment could be made relevant to 
residents of all economic strata, as well as to the varied 
organizations with which they are or could be involved.  
 
In the policy domain, community-generated knowledge 
might lead to policies that are guided by a multifaceted, 
multilevel vision of economically embedded social action. 
The crafting of integrated health, housing and employment 
support policies, among others, could actualize such a 
vision. As a small example, the recent increase in the 
maximum Pell grant (Schemo, 2007) was a policy direction 
that could help family heads like Elizabeth Seabrook meet 
the intersecting and competing demands of education, work 
and family life, not only before, but also during and after a 
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation. Thinking of 
education, job training, employment, and policy, for 
example, as embedded in families’ economic actions might 
help to break down and ultimately eliminate some of the 
bureaucratic organizational boundaries that have 
constrained mobility for families like those in this research, 
and more generally, that have perpetuated stratification and 
class division.  
 
In terms of scholarly inquiry, further theoretically based 
research could enhance knowledge building about 
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embeddedness and disaster situations, generally and 
specifically for New Orleans. For example, because the 
exploration and resultant theorizing about embeddedness in 
this article derived in part from reanalysis of existing 
empirical material, a next step would be to use an 
embeddedness network perspective in the design of original 
field research (Schweizer, 1997). Schweizer called 
particularly for longitudinal examination of network studies 
of social organizations (p. 756), which would certainly 
include intermediary networks, and by definition, network 
assessment would involve human and organizational or 
institutional actors. As such, longitudinal research on the 
enhanced social vulnerability protocol suggested earlier 
could reveal prospectively how differently each of the New 
Orleans families in this research might fare during a 
situation involving a hurricane, as well as what networked 
personal, policy and organizational ties each would need in 
order to construct new economic futures thereafter.  
 
Future research could also valuably pursue the relevance of 
embeddedness and network concepts in other parts of the 
world that experience disaster situations similar to 
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans. For example, Caporale’s 
(2000) study of rainstorm-related landslides in Italy in 1998 
and Donohue, Masileia, and Gears’ (2000) report about 
flood devastation in South Africa in 2000 revealed 
important parallels to the continuing danger in New 
Orleans from the inadequate preventive and responsive 
measures provided by all levels of government. Cross-
cultural knowledge building, as disaster anthropology has 
valuably shown (Oliver-Smith, 1996), is a potentially rich 
learning and planning strategy. As evidence, Wisner (2001) 
reported that community-based social vulnerability 
assessments have emerged in countries outside the United 
States, whereby “the community defines its own 
vulnerabilities and capabilities; outsiders don’t” (p. 5).  
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More broadly, varied conceptual approaches to disaster 
situations, such as systems, social vulnerabliity, and 
embeddedness, could be compared within the United States 
and across cultural domains, without losing sight of what is 
sociologically useful (Stallings, 2002, p. 284). In this case, 
additional examples and deeper understanding of the 
economic embeddedness of disaster situations such as 
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans would be sociologically 
useful. For example, because application of the findings 
and perspective in this article are limited to the Hurricane 
Katrina–New Orleans situation, broader inquiry could 
potentially ascertain whether the current findings are 
relevant to other types of disaster situations or to similar 
types of disaster situations in other geographic and cultural 
milieus. Ultimately, research and planning deriving from a 
sociological embeddedness perspective on disaster 
situations such as Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans seem to 
constitute both an essential step toward greater societal 
economic well-being and an ongoing charge to those trying 
to build a more just, inclusive world.  
 
References  
 
Alexander, D. (2006). Symbolic and practical implications 
of the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans. Social 
Science Research Council. Retrieved July 13, 2007, from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Alexander/printable.ht
ml 
 
Achenbach, J. (2008). Man to blame for Iowa flooding? 
The Washington Post. Retrieved June 19, 2008, from 
www.msnbc.com/id/25254541/ 
 
Barber, B. (1995). All economies are “embedded”: The 
career of a concept, and beyond. Social Research, 62(2), 
387–413.  
 
 33
Barnshaw, J., & Trainor, J. (2007). Race, class, and capital 
amidst the Hurricane Katrina diaspora. In  
D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The 
sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a  
modern catastrophe (pp. 91–105). Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield.  
 
Beck, U. (2006). Living in the world risk society. Economy 
and Society, 35(3), 329–345.  
 
Berke, P. R., & Campanella, T. J. (2006). Planning for 
postdisaster resiliency. Annals of the American  
Academy of Political and Social Science, 604, 192–207.  
 
Breunlin, R., & Regis, H. A. (2006). Putting the Ninth 
Ward on the map: Race, place, and transformation in 
Desire, New Orleans. American Anthropologist, 108(4), 
744–764.  
 
Brunsma, D. L., Overfelt, D., & Picou, J. S. (2007). The 
sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern 
catastrophe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
Burawoy, M. (2003). Revisits: An outline of a theory of 
reflexive ethnography. American Sociological Review, 68, 
645–679.  
 
Burawoy, M., Blum, J. A., George, S., Gille, Z., Gowan, T., 
Haney, L., et al. (2000). Global ethnography: Forces, 
connections, and imaginations in a postmodern world. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Cacibauda, D. M. (2007). Public Meeting re: “X” Housing 
Development. Verbatim court report of Section 106 
consultation meeting, New Orleans, LA: Housing Authority 
of New Orleans.  
 
 34
Caporale, R. (2000). The May 1998 landslides in the Sarno 
area in Southern Italy: Rethinking disaster theory. 
Retrieved July 13, 2007, from 
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/research/qr/qr131/qr131.
html 
 
Capowich, G. E., & Kondkar, M. M. (2007). Rebuilding 
New Orleans neighborhoods after Hurricane Katrina: 
Toward a theory of social structure and cultural creativity. 
In D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The 
sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern catas-
trophe (pp. 173–190). Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
 
Clarke, L. (2007). Postscript: Considering Katrina. In D. L. 
Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The sociology 
of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern catastrophe (pp. 
235–241). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap.  
 
Colten, C. E. (2006). Vulnerability and place: Flat land and 
uneven risk in New Orleans. American Anthropologist, 
108(4), 731–734.  
 
Cooper, C., & Block, R. 2006. Disaster: Hurricane Katrina 
and the failure of Homeland Security. New York: Henry 
Holt and Company.  
 
Costanza, R., Mitsch, W. J., & Day, J. W., Jr. (2006). 
Creating a sustainable and desirable New Orleans. 
Ecological Engineering, 26, 317–320.  
 
Cutter, S. L. (2005). Are we asking the right question? In 
R. W. Perry & E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), What is a disaster?: 
New answers to old questions, (pp. 39–48). Philadelphia: 
Xlibris.  
 35
 
Cutter, S. (2006). The geography of social vulnerability: 
Race, class, and catastrophe. Retrieved May 10, 2008, from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Cutter 
 
Cutter, S. L., Boruff, B. J., & Shirley, W. L. (2003). Social 
vulnerability to environmental hazards. Social Science 
Quarterly, 84(2), 242–261.  
 
Cutter, S. L., & Emrich. C. (2006). Moral hazard, social 
catastrophe: The changing face of vulnerability along the 
hurricane coasts. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political Science, 684, 102–112.  
 
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005) ‘Introduction,’ In 
N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of 
qualitative research (3rd ed., pp. 1–32). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.  
 
Dolfman, M. L., Wasser, S. F., & Bergman, B. (2007). The 
effects of Hurricane Katrina on the New Orleans economy. 
Monthly Labor Review, 130(6), 3–18.  
 
Donohue, S., Masilela, T., & Gear, J. (2000). Disaster 
management. In A. Ntuli (Ed.), South African health 
review, (pp. 455–465). Zaire, South Africa: Health Systems 
Trust.  
 
Duneier, M. (1999). Sidewalk. New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux.  
 
Dynes, R. R., & Rodríguez, H. (2007). Finding and framing 
Katrina: The social construction of disaster. In D. L. 
Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The sociology 
of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern catastrophe (pp. 23–
33). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 36
Elliott, J. R., & Pais, J. (2006). Race, class, and Hurricane 
Katrina: Social differences in human responses to disaster. 
Social Science Research, 35, 295–321.  
 
Enarson, E. (2006). Women and girls last?: Averting the 
second post-Katrina disaster. Retrieved May 10, 2008, from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/deWaal/printable.html 
 
Erikson, K. (2006). Disaster, environment and social order: 
Reflections on Katrina. Gaylord Nelson Retrospective 
Lecture Series. Retrieved March 30, 2008, from 
http://www.nelson.wisc.edu/legacy/lectures/erikson.doc 
 
Erikson, K. (2007). Foreword. In D. L. Brunsma, D. 
Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The sociology of Katrina: 
Perspectives on a modern catastrophe (pp. xvii–xx). 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
Ethridge, R. (2006). Bearing witness: Assumptions, 
realities, and the otherizing of Katrina. American 
Anthropologist, 108(4), 799–813.  
 
Friedman, P. & Relave, N. (2005). Managing in 
emergencies. Strategy Brief . Washington, DC: The 
Finance Project.  
 
Gilman, N. (2006). What Katrina teaches about the 
meaning of racism. Social Science Research Council. 
Retrieved July 13, 2007, from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Gilman/printable.html 
 
Giloth, R. (Ed.). (2004). Workforce intermediaries for the 
twenty-first century. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 
in association with The American Assembly, Columbia 
University Press.  
 
Gist, R., Lubin, B., & Redburn, B. G. (1998). Psychosocial, 
ecological, and community perspectives on disaster 
 37
response. Journal of Personal & Interpersonal Loss, 3(1), 
25–51.  
 
Gordon, M. (2007). Scientists point out missed chances 
with rebuilding efforts could hamper flood protection. The 
Times-Picayune. Retrieved July 23, 2007, from 
http://www.nola.com 
 
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. 
American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380.  
 
Granovetter, M. (1983). The strength of weak ties: A 
network theory revisited. Sociological Theory, 1,  
201–233.  
 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social 
structure: The problem of embeddedness. American 
Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510.  
 
Granovetter, M. (1992a). Economic institutions as social 
constructions: A framework for analysis. Acta Sociologica, 
35,3–11.  
 
Granovetter, M. (1992b). Problems of explanation in 
economic sociology. In N. Nohria & R. G. Eccles (Eds.), 
Networks and organizations: Structure, form, and action 
(pp. 25–56). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
 
Granovetter, M. (2005). The impact of social structure on 
economic outcomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
19(1), 33–50.  
 
Hartman, C., & Squires, G. D. (Eds.). (2006). There is no 
such thing as a natural disaster: Race, class, and 
Hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge.  
 
Hartmann, K. (1999). Differences in dealing with disaster: 
Research on the flood of the River Oder in the summer of 
 38
1997. Paper presented at the 4th European Conference of 
Sociology, August 18–21, 1999, Vrije Universitet, 
Amsterdam. Retrieved July 13, 2007 from 
http://www.erc.gr/English/d&scrn/klaushartmann.htm 
 
Hebert, S., Welch, D., St. George, A., Berrien, J., Schwartz, 
A., Mueller, E., & Parkes, S. R. (2002). AECF Jobs 
Initiative: Evaluation of the capacity building phase, April 
1997–2000. Boston, MA: Abt Associates and New York: 
The New School University.  
 
Hilhorst, D. (2003). Unlocking disaster paradigms: An 
actor-oriented focus on disaster response. Paper presented 
at the 6th European Conference of Sociology, September 
23–26, 2003, Murcia, Spain. 
 
Holcombe, E. (2007). Understanding community-based 
disaster response: Houston’s religious congregations and 
Hurricane Katrina’s relief efforts. In D. L. Brunsma, D. 
Overfelt, & J. S. Picou (Eds.), The sociology of Katrina: 
Perspectives on a modern catastrophe (pp. 107–119). 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
 
Hurlbert, J. S., Beggs, J. J., & Haines, V. A. (2006). 
Bridges over troubled waters: What are the optimal 
networks for Katrina’s victims? Paper prepared in 
Sept./Oct. 2005 for the Social Science Research Council, 
published June 11, 2006. Retrieved July 13, 2007 from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Hurlbert Beggs 
Haines/printable.html 
 
Hurlbert, J. S., Haines, V. A., & Beggs, J. J. (2000). Core 
networks and tie activation: What kinds of routine networks 
allocate resources in nonroutine situations? American 
Sociological Review, 65, 598–618.  
 
Ibata-Arens, K., Dierkes, J., & Zorn, D. (2006). Guest 
editors’ introduction: Theoretical introduction to the special 
 39
issue on the embedded enterprise. Enterprise & Society, 
7(1), 1–18.  
 
Iversen, R. R., & Armstrong, A. L. (2006). Jobs aren’t 
enough: Toward a new economic mobility for low-income 
families. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.  
 
Jagd, S. (2007). Economics of convention and new 
economic sociology. Current Sociology, 55(1), 75–91.  
 
Johnson, T. (2008, May 17). Quake puts focus on poorly 
built schools. The Philadelphia Inquirer, p. A2.  
 
Kamenetz, A. (2005, December 1). Black out. The Village 
Voice. Retrieved July 29, 2007 from 
http://www.villagevoice.com 
 
Kettl, D. F. (2006). Is the worst yet to come? Annals of the 
American Academy of Political Science, 604, 273–287.  
 
Kiesling, L., & Irons, J. S. (2005). The economics of 
rebuilding. Wall Street Journal, October 4. Retrieved May 
11, 2008 from http://online.wsj.com 
 
Krippner, G. R., & Alvarez, A. S. (2007). Embeddedness 
and the intellectual projects of economic sociology. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 33, 219–240.  
 
Krippner, G., Granovetter, M., Block, F., Biggart, N., & 
Beamish, T. (2004). Polanyi symposium: A conversation 
on embeddedness. Socio-Economic Review, 2, 109–135.  
 
Kroll-Smith, S. (2001). Review of The Northbridge 
earthquake: Vulnerability and disaster, by R. Bolin with L. 
Stanford. Contemporary Sociology, 30(2), 175–176.  
 
Lazer, D. (2006). Structural versus relational 
embeddedness: A useful concept for effective knowledge 
 40
sharing within firms? Retrieved February 19, 2008, from 
www.iq.harvard.edu/blog/netgov/2006/02/structural_vs_rel
ational_embed.html 
 
Lehrer, J. (2008, April 1). In New Orleans, reinventing the 
idea of public housing. Online NewsHour report. Retrieved 
April 15, 2008 from www.pbs.org 
 
Liu, A., & Plyer, A. (2008). The New Orleans Index. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, and New Orleans: 
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center. 
  
Logan, J. R. (2006). The impact of Katrina: Race and class 
in storm-damaged neighborhoods. Retrieved June 20, 2008 
from www.s4.brown.edu 
  
Louisiana Department of Education. (2001). Reaching for 
results: 2000–2001 school report card for parents. 
Retrieved September 8, 2002 from 
http://www.lcet.doe.la.us 
 
Louisiana Department of Social Services. (2008). Child 
Care Assistance Program (CCAP). Retrieved June 23, 2008 
from http://www.dss.louisiana.gov/departments/ofs/Child 
Care Assistance Program.html 
 
Marcus, G. E. (1998) Ethnography through thick and thin. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Maruyama, G., & Ruscher, J. B. (2006). Postscript and a 
call for change. Analyses of Social Issues and Public 
Policy, 6(1), 255–261.  
 
McEntire, D. A., Fuller, C., Johnston, C. W., & Weber, R. 
(2002). A comparison of disaster paradigms: The search for 
a holistic policy guide. Public Administration Review, 
62(3), 267–281.  
 41
Miller, D. S., & Rivera, J. D. (2007). Landscapes of 
disaster and place orientation in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina. In D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. Picou 
(Eds.), The sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a modern 
catastrophe (pp. 141–154). Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
  
Montuori, A., & Purser, R. (1996). Ecological futures: 
Systems theory, postmodernism, and participative learning 
in an age of uncertainty. In D. Boje, D. Gephart, & T. 
Joseph (Eds.), Postmodernism and organization theory (pp. 
181–201). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
 
Moody, J., & White, D. R. (2003). Structural cohesion and 
embeddedness: A hierarchical concept of social groups. 
American Sociological Review, 68(1), 103–127.  
 
Muro, M., Lieu, A., Sohmer, R., Warren, D., Park, D., et al. 
(2005). New Orleans after the storm: Lessons from the 
past, a plan for the future. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution.  
 
Napier, J. L., Mandizodza, A. N., Anderson, S. M., & Jost, 
J. T. (2006). System justification in responding to the poor 
and displaced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 6(1), 57–73.  
 
Needels, K., Corson, W., & Nicholson, W. (2001). Left out 
of the boom economy. Report #8573. Princeton, NJ: 
Mathematica Policy Research.  
 
Nelson, R. (2003, May 10). Orleans scores stagnate. The 
Times-Picayune, A1, 3.  
 
Oliver-Smith, A. (1996). Anthropological research on 
hazards and disasters. Annual Review of Anthropology, 25, 
303–328.  
 42
Oliver-Smith, A. (2006). Disasters and forced migration in 
the 21st century. Retrieved June 21, 2008 from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Oliver-Smith 
 
Ostrander, S. A. (1995). Money for change. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press.  
 
Ouroussoff, N. (2006, November 19). All fall down. New 
York Times, Sec. 4, pp. 1, 14.  
 
Ouroussoff, N. (2007, December 19). High noon in New 
Orleans: The bulldozers are ready. New York Times, pp. 
B1, 6.  
 
Padgett, D. K. (2008). Qualitative methods in social work 
research (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
Perry, R. W. (2005). Disasters, definitions and theory 
construction. In R. W. Perry & E. L. Quarantelli (Eds.), 
What is a disaster?: New answers to old questions (pp. 
311–324). Philadelphia: Xlibris.  
 
Perry, R. W., & Quarantelli, E. L. (2005). What is a 
disaster?: New answers to old questions. Philadelphia: 
Xlibris.  
 
Picou, J. S., & Marshall, B. K. (2007). Katrina as a 
paradigm shift: Reflections on disaster research in the 
twenty-first century. In D. L. Brunsma, D. Overfelt, & J. S. 
Picou (Eds.), The sociology of Katrina: Perspectives on a 
modern catastrophe (pp. 1–20). Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
 
Plaisance, S. (2006, August 8). A jump on the school year. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer,p.A3.  
 
 43
Plyer, A. (2007). The Katrina Index. New Orleans, LA: 
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center and 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.  
 
Polanyi, K. (2001). The great transformation. Boston: 
Beacon. (Original work published in 1944.)  
 
Portes, A., & Sensenbrenner, J. (1993). Embeddedness and 
immigration: Notes on the social determinants of economic 
action. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), 1320–1350.  
 
Quarantelli, E. L. (2005). A social science research agenda 
for the disasters of the 21st century: Theoretical, 
methodological and empirical issues and their professional 
implementation. In R. W. Perry & E. S. Quarantelli (Eds.), 
What is a disaster?: New answers to old questions (pp. 
325–396). Philadelphia: Xlibris.  
 
Quarantelli, E. L. (2006). Catastrophes are different from 
disasters: Some implications for crisis planning and 
managing drawn from Katrina. Retrieved July 13, 2007, 
from http://www.understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli 
 
Revkin, A. C. (2008, May 11). The dangers of the deltas. 
The New York Times, Week in Review section (WK), p. 3.  
 
Rodríguez, H., Trainor, J., & Quarantelli, E. L. (2006). 
Rising to the challenges of a catastrophe: The emergent and 
prosocial behavior following Hurricane Katrina. Annals of 
the American Academy of Political Science, 604, 82–101.  
 
Schemo, D. J. (2006, September 2). At 2-year colleges, 
students eager but unprepared. The New York Times. 
Retrieved August 4, 2007 from 
http://select.nytimes.com/search 
 
  
 44
Schemo, D. J. (2007, July 10). Senate approves major 
overhaul of the federal student aid program. The New York 
Times. Retrieved August 4, 2007 from 
http://select.nytimes.com/search 
 
Schweizer, T. (1997). Embeddedness of ethnographic 
cases: A social networks perspective. Current 
Anthropology, 38(5), 739–760.  
 
Smith, N. 2006. There’s no such thing as a natural disaster. 
Social Science Research Council. Retrieved July 13, 2007 
from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith/printable.html 
 
Stahl, B. C., Lichtenstein, Y., & Mangan, A. (2003). The 
limits of risk management—A social construction 
approach. Communications of the International Information 
Management Association, 3(3), 15–22.  
 
Stallings, R. (2002). Weberian political sociology and 
sociological disaster studies. Sociological Forum, 17(2), 
281–305.  
 
Stallings, R. (2005). Disaster, crisis, collective stress, and 
mass deprivation. In R. W. Perry & E. L. Quarantelli 
(Eds.), What is a disaster?: New answers to old questions 
(pp. 237–274). Philadelphia: Xlibris.  
 
Swedberg, R. (1997). New economic sociology: What has 
been accomplished, what is ahead? Acta Sociologica, 40, 
161–182.  
 
Swedberg, R. (2003). Principles of economic sociology. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Taylor, J. G. (1984). Louisiana: A history. New York: 
W.W. Norton.  
 
 45
Tierney, K. (2006). The red pill. Social Science Research 
Council, June 11. Retrieved May 17, 2008 from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Tierney/printable.html 
 
Tierney, K. (2007). From the margins to the mainstream? 
Disaster research at the crossroads. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 33, 503–525.  
 
Tierney, K., Bevc, C., & Kuligowski, E. (2006). Metaphors 
matter: Disaster myths, media frames, and their 
consequences in Hurricane Katrina. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 604, 
57–81.  
 
Trigilia, C. (2007). Unbalanced growth: Why is economic 
sociology stronger in theory than in policies? Current 
Sociology, 55(1), 59–74.  
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). 
Fiscal year 2001: Characteristics and financial 
circumstances of TANF recipients. Washington, DC: 
Author, Administration for Children & Families. Retrieved 
August 18, 2004 from 
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/FY2001/charace
ristics.htm 
 
United States Risk Management, L.L.C. (2007). 
“Environmental justice study: “X” Housing development, 
New Orleans, Louisiana.” USRM Project No. 15060166. 
New Orleans, LA: Author.  
 
Venton, P., & Hansford, B. (2006). Reducing risk of 
disaster in our communities. Teddington, UK: Tearfund.  
 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society, Volumes I and II. 
In G. Roth & C. Wittich (Eds.). Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. (Original work published 1922).  
 
 46
Willis, P. (2000). The ethnographic imagination. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity.  
 
Wisner, B. (2001). ‘Vulnerability’ in disaster theory and 
practice: From soup to taxonomy, then to  
analysis and finally tool. Paper presented at the 
International Work-Conference, Disaster Studies  
of Wageningen University and Research Centre, 29/30 
June, 2001.  
 
Zelizer, V. (2002). Intimate transactions. In M. F. Guillen, 
R. Collins, P. England, & M. Meyer (Eds.),  
The new economic sociology: Developments in an 
emerging field (pp. 274–300). New York:  
Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
Zukin, S., & DiMaggio, P. (1990). Introduction. In S. 
Zukin & P. DiMaggio (Eds.), Structures of capital  
(pp. 1–36). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
ROBERTA REHNER IVERSEN, PhD, is an associate 
professor of social work in the School of Social Policy & 
Practice at the University of Pennsylvania. Her 
ethnographic research focuses on economic mobility and 
low-income inner-city families. The analysis in ASAP is an 
extension of the grant-funded ethnography that resulted in 
Jobs Aren’t Enough: Toward a New Mobility for Low-
Income Families (coauthor Annie Laurie Armstrong), 
published in 2006 by Temple University Press. That five-
year, five-city project followed 25 families and over 1,000 
auxiliaries and resulted in policy changes and program 
improvements in both welfare and workforce development 
arenas.  
 
ANNIE LAURIE ARMSTRONG has been the owner of 
Business Government Community Connections, a national 
research and evaluation firm which focuses on education, 
 47
 48
economic security, and social justice issues, since 1981. 
She has a Master’s degree in Public Administration from 
the University of Washington. She is an ethnographer and 
coauthor of Jobs Aren’t Enough, a book that portrays the 
economic mobility experiences of 25 families from five 
cities. She is also an activist and proponent for whole 
family services, and has worked to successfully craft policy 
and funding strategies to support integrated education, 
employment, and human service efforts.  
 
This research was generously supported by independent 
grants to the first author from the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, although the contents of this article do not 
necessarily reflect the opinions of the Foundation. The 
authors are grateful to the New Orleans families for their 
participation, and to the local ethnographic team and the 
intermediary administrator for their penetrating insights 
into present-day New Orleans. We also appreciate the 
extremely thoughtful comments from the anonymous 
reviewers and from Professor Laurie O’Brian, all of whom 
significantly enriched this article. 
 
 
